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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CTX FINANCIAL, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
CAROLYN MURPHY, HARRY MURPHY, 
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS, MIKE 
VARDAKIS, LeGRANDE L. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants, Appellees 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 950027-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k) (1953). The appeal was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are these: 
1. Does the existence of a marital relationship 
between two people automatically give to each of them an 
ownership interest in property owned by the other? 
2. Does a purchaser of personalty take title to 
the property when the seller has no ownership interest in it 
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\BRIEF CTX 1 
and the true owner has no knowledge, and has given no 
permission for, the sale? 
The district courtf s findings of fact are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Alta Industries, Ltd. v. 
Hurst/ 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah 
Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994). The findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. 
Bradley/ 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Sorenson. supra at 1147. 
The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
CJL., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993); McMahan v. Dees, 873 P.2d 1172 
(Utah App. 1994). 
This action was tried to the district court sitting 
without a jury. Appellant appeals the adequacy and correctness 
of the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The findings and conclusions were made after the close of trial 
and after the court had taken the matter under advisement. 
Appellant could not voice his criticism of the district court's 
decision until after it had completed its review. Accordingly, 
Appellant timely filed with the district court a motion to amend 
the findings, to make additional findings, and to amend the legal 
2 
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conclusions and judgment accordingly. R. 855. The motion was 
denied. R. 900. The issues now are raised on appeal. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
There are no specific statutes or rules whose 
interpretation will determine this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action was brought to determine the ownership of 
personal property. 
Course Q£ Proceedings 
The Complaint was filed on February 27, 1992. R. 2. 
Discovery was undertaken and completed. Defendants LeGrande 
Christensen, AAA Jewelers & Loans and Mike Vardakis settled with 
plaintiff CTX Financial. R. 746, 777. Defendant Carolyn Murphy 
filed a petition in bankruptcy and all action against her 
stopped. R. 839; Tr. 924-926, 1063. Trial was held before the 
district court, sitting without a jury, on March 7-8, 1994. 
Defendants Mike Vardakis and Harry Murphy pursued at trial their 
competing claims for ownership of an antique piano (Tr. 924), and 
Harry Murphy also pursued his cross-claim against defendant 
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\BRIEF CTX 3 
LeGrande Christensen for ownership of an antique silver service. 
The court took the matter under advisement. 
On April 5, 1994, judgment was granted in favor of 
Harry Murphy on his cross-claim against LeGrande Christensen. 
R. 793. On that same day the district court filed a Memorandum 
Decision1 disposing of the parties' claims for the piano. R. 
779. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law2 and Judgment3 were 
filed on June 22. 1994. R. 838, 852. A motion was made to amend 
the findings, conclusions and judgment. R. 855. It was denied 
on October 12, 1994. R. 901. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Ownership Of The "B" Piano. 
1. Defendant Harry Murphy married co-defendant 
Carolyn Murphy in 1955. Tr. 990, 1034. 
2. In 1965 or 1966, he purchased a Mason & Hamblin 
semi-concert grand piano, model "BB," from the San Rafael Music 
Company. Tr. 990, 1018, 1038. He previously had spoken with 
with someone at the store and expressed an interest in purchasing 
1
 The Memorandum Decision is included in Addendum A. 
2
 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are included 
in Addendum B. 
3
 The Judgment is included in Addendum C. 
4 
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a Mason & Hamblin piano. He was told the store was expecting one. 
When it arrived, he was notified, made an inspection and 
purchased it. Tr. 1038. 
3. Harry received a bill of sale made to him alone. 
Tr. 1018-1019. 
4. He financed the purchase through the music 
company. Tr. 991, 1018. Carolyn did not sign any of the 
financing documents. Tr. 1018. 
5. Harry made payments by check every month. Tr. 
1019. Each check was drawn on an account held only in his name. 
Tr. 1019. Funds deposited in his checking account came solely 
from his employment. Tr. 1020. 
6. Only Harry was employed, and he was responsible 
for payment of family expenses and for the purchase of all 
household furnishings. Tr. 996. 
7. Carolyn had her own checking account. Tr. 1019. 
Funds deposited in her account came from Harry. Tr. 1020. She 
was not then employed outside the home. Tr. 996, 1021, 1052. 
8. Carolyn began working part-time in the late 1960's 
and full-time in the late 1970's. Tr. 996. When she worked 
full-time, she contributed to the household expenses. Tr. 997, 
1053. 
5 
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9. Harry bought the piano to encourage his childrens' 
music talents. Tr. 1038-1039. 
10. There was not another piano in the household. Tr. 
1039. 
11. In 1969, Carolyn was given a Mason & Hamblin semi-
concert grand piano, model "M." It was a gift to her from the 
widower of the childrens1 piano teacher. Tr. 1017, 1040. 
12. Carolyn and the Murphys' three children played 
piano. Harry did not. Tr. 994. 
13. The Murphys' children played on both the "A" and 
11B" pianos. Tr. 1017. 
14. Carolyn periodically gave lessons to other 
children. The lessons were given on both the "A" and the "B" 
pianos. Tr. 994-995. 
15. The money she earned from those lessons was hers. 
Harry did not know what she did with it. Tr. 995. 
16. Carolyn did not pay Harry to use the "B" piano and 
it was not necessary that she ask him for permission to use it. 
Tr. 995. 
17. The "B" piano was tuned approximately every six 
months. Both Mr. and Mrs. Murphy arranged for the tuning. Tr. 
995-996. 
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\BRIEF CTX ° 
18. They both cleaned the "B" piano. Tr. 996. 
19. The Murphys had an understanding that the "A" 
piano belonged to Carolyn and the "B" piano belonged to Harry. 
They maintained that distinction over the course of their 
marriage. Tr. 1015-1016, 1040, 1054-1055. 
B. Pawn Transactions. 
20. Plaintiff CTX Financial is a pawn shop. Tr. 950. 
21. Michael Wright, the office manager for CTX 
Financial, testified at trial. Tr. 950. 
22. He testified that he first met Carolyn in 1989 
when she requested CTX Financial to pawn two pianos which she 
said she owned. Tr. 950-951. One of those pianos was the "B" 
piano. Tr. 952. 
23. Carolyn pawned both pianos. Tr. 951. 
24. CTX Financial did not take possession of either 
piano. It did not want to assume responsibility for their 
storage and Carolyn told CTX Financial that she was teaching on 
them and needed them for her work. Tr. 953. On one occasion, 
however, Mr. Wright visited Carolyn's home and inspected the 
pianos. Tr. 960. 
25. Carolyn subsequently entered into six other, 
separate pawn transactions over the following three years, from 
7 
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1989 into 1991. At least one again involved the "B" piano. Tr. 
955, 972-973. 
26. In each transaction CTX Financial required Carolyn 
to represent that she alone owned the personalty she proposed to 
pawn, that she had good title to it and that she had the right to 
sell it. Tr. 974. 
27. Near the end of these multiple transactions with 
Carolyn, CTX Financial had exacted collateral from her which 
consisted of all the household furnishings then located in her 
residence. Tr. 977-979. 
28. Mr. Wright testified he knew Carolyn had children 
and that she had a husband. He did not know whether she still 
was married or divorced or whether she and her husband lived 
together or apart. Nevertheless, Mr. Wright still exacted from 
Carolyn a security interest in all of her household furnishings. 
Tr. 979-983. 
29. Mr. Wright testified that during one pawn 
transaction in 1991, Carolyn told him she intended to use the 
money loaned on the pawn for her business (the sale of books to 
the public). Tr. 957-958. 
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30. Defendant Mike Vardakis testified that he met 
Carolyn in February 1991 to purchase from her the "B" piano. Tr. 
986. 
31. Carolyn gave him a bill of sale in which she 
represented that she owned the piano. Tr. 986. 
32. Mr. Vardakis had not known Carolyn before the 
sale, and he did not know (or ask) whether she was married. Tr. 
988. 
C. Divorce Proceedings 
33. The Murphys filed for divorce in the Third 
Judicial District Court For Salt Lake County, Utah, on August 17, 
1990. They separated on approximately September 1. Tr. 992, 
1037. 
34. When they separated Harry did not take with him 
the "B" piano. Tr. 992, 1037. 
35. In 1989-1990, before the Murphys separated, 
Carolyn usually paid rent for the family, although Harry paid it 
on occasion. He did pay all other family expenses, however. Tr. 
997, 1046. 
36. At the time of the pawn transactions, Carolyn was 
employed selling books. Harry knew nothing about her business. 
Tr. 997, 1036-1037. 
9 
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37. Carolyn did not make a claim for the ,fBM piano in 
the divorce action. Tr. 992-993. Harry, on the other hand, 
considered it his property and asked it be awarded to him. Tr. 
993. 
38. The "B" piano was awarded to Harry as his property 
in the decree of divorce. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 23. 
D. Knowledge of the Pawn Transactions. 
39. Harry did not know Carolyn had used his property 
to collateralize her pawn transactions until the morning they 
both appeared before Judge Pat Brian in August 1991 to finalize 
their divorce. Tr. 993-994, 1034, 1056-1058; Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibit 23. 
40. He did not sign any of the pawn documents. 
Carolyn never showed them to him or discussed using as collateral 
any of the personalty identified in the documents. Tr. 1035. 
41. Harry never authorized Carolyn to use any of his 
property as collateral or to sell it. Tr. 1035. 
42. She never told him she was borrowing money or 
selling possessions to raise funds. Tr. 1036. 
43. Carolyn never asked Harry for permission to sell 
the "B" piano, to pawn it, or to use it as collateral. Tr. 1040. 
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44. Harry never received money from his wife. Tr. 
1036. And, he had no knowledge of what she did with the money 
she had received from CTX Financial or Mr. Vardakis. Tr. 103 6. 
E. Carolyn's Testimony. 
45. Carolyn was called as a witness at trial. Tr. 
1063. 
46. She admitted Harry had purchased the "B" piano. 
Tr. 1070. She also admitted that she had not asked him for 
permission to sell the piano or to collateralize it, and she 
conceded that to the extent she sold or otherwise used the piano, 
she did so without his knowledge. Tr. 1070-1071. 
47. Carolyn testified that she did not discuss her 
pawn transactions with Harry, either in advance or afterwards. 
Tr. 1071. 
48. Carolyn refused to answer other questions at trial 
for fear her answers might incriminate her. Tr. 1063-1070. 
Accordingly, the district court took judicial notice of an 
affidavit she previously had made in the case on April 20, 1993. 
Tr. 1074. In the affidavit, Carolyn testified: 
3. In the mid-1960fs, Harry purchased a Mason & 
Hamblin semi-concert grand piano (Model BB, No. 2536) 
C \WPWIN60\WPDOCS\REL\BRIEF CTX -*"-*-
for himself. He purchased the piano with his own funds. 
4. I did not own the piano and I did not have an 
ownership interest in the piano. 
5. The piano was at all times the property of 
Harry Murphy. 
6. At no time did I ever ask Harry for, or 
receive from him, his permission to sell his piano or 
to use it as collateral for any loan. He did not have 
knowledge that I allegedly did so, and he only learned 
of such allegations on the day of our divorce. 
Tr. 324-325. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. All evidence received at trial showed that 
ownership of the "B" piano always rested with Mr. Murphy. It was 
his sole property. There is no evidence to the contrary. 
2. Mrs. Murphy did not have an ownership interest in 
the "B" piano. Therefore, when she sold it to Mr. Vardakis, 
without Mr. Murphy's permission or knowledge, Mr. Vardakis did 
not acquire any interest in it. He could take from Mrs. Murphy 
no greater title than she had. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Carolyn Murphy sold, pledged or otherwise encumbered 
household furnishings and personalty, specifically including an 
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antique, semi-concert grand piano. She dealt with a pawn shop 
(plaintiff CTX Financial) and an individual employee (defendant 
Mike Vardakis) of another pawn shop (AAA Jewelers & Loans). 
Carolyn's transactions with CTX spanned three years (1989-1991); 
she had a single transaction with Mr. Vardakis (1991). Ms. 
Murphy's former husband, defendant-appellant Harry Murphy, knew 
nothing of the transactions and he had not given her permission 
to sell or dispose of any property which was his or which they 
owned together as part of their marital property. At the time of 
the transactions the Murphys were separated and parties to a 
divorce action pending in the Third Judicial District Court For 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The district court generally found the piano to be 
marital property, jointly owned by Carolyn and Harry. The court 
found Mr. Vardakis was an innocent purchaser of the piano and, 
for that reason, he took Mr. Murphy's one-half interest in the 
piano, even though Mr. Murphy had no notice of the piano's sale 
by Mrs. Murphy. 
Mr. Murphy claims ownership of the piano. 
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1. The Existence of a Marital Relationship Between Mr. and Mrs. 
Murphy Did Not Automatically Give To Each of Them An 
Ownership Interest In Property Owned By The Other. The 
Piano Was Not Marital Property-
The district court determined the "B" piano was marital 
property owned jointly by Mr. and Mrs. Murphy. That 
determination is wrong, and the court's findings and conclusions 
on the issue are not supported by the evidence. Each is 
discussed below. 
Finding No. 6. The court found that Mrs. Murphy used 
the proceeds from her transactions for marital expenses. There 
was no such evidence received at trial. Only four witnesses were 
called to testify: Mrs. Murphy, Mr. Murphy, Michael Wright and 
Mr. Vardakis. Mrs. Murphy neither was questioned nor did she 
offer testimony about her use of the proceeds. Mr. Murphy 
testified that he did not know what she had done with the 
proceeds but that he did not receive any of it. Mr. Vardakis was 
not asked the question (nor was he in a position to know). Only 
Mr. Wright was examined on the issue. He testified, under cross-
examination by his own lawyer, that during one loan transaction 
Mrs. Murphy had told him she needed the money to finance her 
business activities. Tr. 957-958. Moreover, the Murphys were 
separated, incident to their divorce action, through most of the 
14 
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time Mrs. Murphy made her transactions. To the extent she used 
the proceeds to pay household expenses, the expenses were hers 
alone, not his. 
That is the only testimony or evidence received on the 
issue of Mrs. Murphy's use of the property. That being the case, 
the only findings that can be made are, first, that Mr. Murphy 
did not knowingly receive any of the proceeds and, second, that 
the proceeds were used for Mrs. Murphy's personal activities. 
Finding of Fact No. 6 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 
3 are not supported by the evidence. 
Finding No. 14. Mr. Murphy testified that he was the 
only one working and that he paid all of the expenses associated 
with the "B" piano, including its purchase, tuning and 
maintenance. There was no other evidence. 
Finding of Fact No. 14 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 
and 3 are not supported by the evidence. 
Finding Nos. 17-19. The district court found that 
property purchased during the Murphys' marriage was presumed to 
be joint marital property. The evidence relied upon by the court 
shows only that the piano was in the marital residence and that 
everyone in the Murphy family had access to it. 
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The existence of a marital relationship between two 
people does not automatically give to each of them an ownership 
interest in property owned by the other. There is no 
prohibition on separate ownership of property by any individual 
even though he or she happens then to be married. In Utah, 
spouses can purchase and own property individually during 
marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-2-1 (1953). They can transfer 
property between them during marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-
2-3 (1953). And, each can bring legal action against the other 
to protect their individual property interests. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-2-6 (1953). Those principles apply here. Mr. Murphy 
owned the piano and maintained it, although everyone in his 
family had access to it. His permissive use of the property does 
not disprove his individual ownership. 
Nevertheless, the sole issue is properly this: Who 
owned it? Mr. and Ms. Murphy offered testimony on that issue, 
and they were the only ones who truly knew the ownership h. ory 
of the piano. Their evidence was that Mr. Murphy had found the 
piano, purchased it and that it was always considered to be his 
sole property. Mrs. Murphy later acquired another piano which 
was treated by all family members as hers. 
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Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 
2 and 3 are not supported by the evidence. 
Finding No. 20. Mr. Murphy filed in February 1991 a 
Financial Declaration and Settlement Proposal in his divorce 
action. He itemized the parties' joint marital debts and then 
specifically listed a small number of property items which could 
be sold to retire them. Both the "A" and "B" pianos were 
identified. Mr. Murphy testified at trial that he proposed to 
sell both pianos, his and Mrs. Murphy's, because they were the 
two most valuable items of personalty and the parties had 
substantial debt. He did not concede in his divorce filings, nor 
in testimony before the district court, that the "B" piano was 
not his alone. Tr. 1059-1061. 
Finding of Fact No. 20 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 
and 3 are not supported by the evidence. 
Finding No. 21. Ms. Murphy's affidavit and her 
testimony before the district court were made under oath, unlike 
her prior representations to CTX and Mr. Vardakis. The purpose 
of an oath is to impress upon the witness the solemnity and 
significance of the occasion and the need for honesty. See 
McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 733-736, 14 Utah 2d 
726 (1963). Ms. Murphy's statements under oath, particularly in 
17 
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light of her discussion with the district court about her rights 
against self- incrimination, ought to give her testimony more 
credibility than her prior statements. It is more reasonable to 
assume, and likely, that she spoke the truth when on the witness 
stand. Accordingly, her courtroom testimony that Mr. Murphy 
owned the piano should be given more credibility. 
Finding of Fact No. 21 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 
and 3 are not supported by the evidence. 
2. A Purchaser of Personalty Cannot Take Title To The Property 
When The Seller Has No Ownership Interest In It And the True 
Qwner Has No Knowledge, And Has Given No Permission Fori The 
Sale, Mike Varflakis Could Not Take Title TQ The Piano From 
MrSt Murphy. 
Finding No. 26. The district court found Mr. Vardakis 
was an innocent purchaser and, for that reason, the court 
determined he acquired Mr. Murphy's interest in the "B" piano. 
The court's conclusion is contrary to law. 
No seller can give better title to property than he or 
she has. £££ Western Surety Co. v. Redding. 626 P.2d 437 439 
(Utah 1981) (thief cannot convey title to vehicle, even to 
unsuspecting purchaser). That is true in real property 
conveyances. See generally 77 Am.Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 
635 (1993) . It is true for personal property, too. See 
generally 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 44. The rule is this: 
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The basic common law rule is that one cannot pass a 
better title than that which he has. Similarly, a 
purchaser can acquire no better title than that of his 
vendor. 
A thief has no title in the stolen goods, and a 
purchaser from the thief gets no title. 
C. Smith and R. Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property. 479 (3d Ed. 
1981). The treatise explains the rules with the following 
hypothetical and discussion: 
CASE 315: A stole B's property and sold it to C, an 
innocent purchaser for value without notice of the 
theft. B discovered these facts and demanded that C 
return the chattels which were still in his possession, 
and also pay him for the value of that stolen property 
which C sold to a third person. C refused, and B filed 
suit. May B recover? 
The answer is yes. A thief acquires no title to 
the goods stolen and he can pass none. The foundation 
rule at common law is that a purchaser can acquire no 
better title than that which his vendor has. To this 
rule there are some exceptions, but the instant case is 
not within any of the exceptions. In a case such as 
this one, the law must decide between two innocent 
parties -- the owner whose property was stolen and the 
innocent purchaser who was misled into buying stolen 
goods. It is equally harsh on whoever must suffer the 
loss -- the innocent owner or the innocent purchaser. 
The equities are equal; therefore, the legal title 
prevails. Note that the innocent purchaser must not 
only return the goods still in his possession, but that 
he also must pay the value of the goods which he sold. 
Such wrongful sale by the purchaser C, was a conversion 
of B's goods regardless of the innocence of C. Thus, B 
can recover. . . 
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Id.4 The law is the same in Utah. See Swartz v. White, 13 P.2d 
643, 645, 80 Utah 150 (1932) ("It is the general rule 'that no 
one can transfer a better title than he has ...'"; "one who 
acquires property by theft, or one who by fraud acquires 
possession of personal property for a particular purpose with the 
intention of appropriating the property to his own use and 
without an intention on the part of the owner to transfer title 
to him, cannot transfer a good title.)". 
Mr. Vardakis did not acquire Mr. Murphy's interest in 
the piano. To the extent Mr. Murphy owned it completely, Mr. 
Vardakis took nothing. To the extent Mr. Murphy owned one-half 
(as his position of joint marital property), Mr. Vardakis 
acquired Ms. Murphy's portion. 
Finding of Fact No. 66 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 6 
and 8 are not supported by the evidence. 
4
 Prosser, looking at the issue as a tort, notes: 
Upon the same basis, a bona fide purchaser of goods 
from one who has stolen them, or who merely has no 
power to transfer them, becomes a converter when he 
takes possession to complete the transaction. 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1971) at 84. £££ 
also (Second) Restatement of Torts, § 229. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vardakis did not acquire an ownership interest in 
the piano. The ruling of the district court should be reversed 
and the piano be awarded to Mr. Murphy as his sole property. 
DATED: May 5, 1995. 
MOYLE SL DRAPER, P.C. 
J£J£#M* 
Reid E. Lewis 
Mark W. May 
Attorneys for Appellant Harry 
Murphy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CTX FINANCIAL, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN MURPHY, HARRY MURPHY, 
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS, MIKE 
VARADAKIS, LeGRANDE L. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 920901080 
The above-referenced matter came before the Court for trial on 
March 7, 1994, At the commencement of the trial, the Court was 
advised regarding the status of the various parties. In that 
regard, the Court understands that the defendant Carolyn Murphy has 
filed bankruptcy, which continues to pend. AAA Jewelers and 
Varadakis are active parties and have apparently paid the plaintiff 
CTX Financial for their claimed interest in the piano, which is the 
subject of this suit. CTX has dismissed its claims against AAA and 
Varadakis, and CTX agreed to indemnify AAA and Varadakis up to the 
sum of $6,000 for any losses that Varadakis and AAA Jewelers may 
suffer as a result of the asserted claim by defendant Harry Murphy 
against the piano in question. Defendant Harry Murphy remains an 
active defendant in the suit, asserting his claim of ownership in 
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the subject piano, and the defendant LeGrande L. Christensen has 
apparently disclaimed any interest he may have in the piano in 
question and did not appear. Carolyn Murphy appeared as a witness, 
with the understanding that any claims asserted against her or by 
her are stayed as a result of her bankruptcy. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court understood that the 
principal contestants in this proceeding, based upon the various 
status of the various plaintiffs and defendants, are CTX on its 
individual claims asserted by Varadakis and Varadakis' individual 
(AAA) claims against the claims of Harry Murphy with regard to the 
ownership in a piano which was described as the "B" piano. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court heard arguments 
of counsel and took the matter under advisement to consider the 
single issue that was presented during the course of the trial, to 
wit: who was the proper entity to have title to the piano in 
question? 
The evidence in this case shows that Carolyn Murphy is the 
former wife of defendant Harry Murphy, and that during the course 
of their marriage she utilized the "B" piano as collateral for 
various loans she obtained. In fact, the evidence shows that she 
utilized all the marital household property, including another 
piano, and all the household furnishings as collateral for various 
loans she obtained from CTX Financial. 
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The evidence shows and the Court finds that Carolyn Murphy at 
no time prior to the divorce between she and defendant Harry Murphy 
disclosed to Mr. Murphy the fact that she had pawned or otherwise 
indebted the family furniture and furnishings to CTX Financial. 
Ms. Murphy has testified, and the Court finds her testimony 
accurate that the money she obtained in the loans was for the most 
part used for marital purposes, including her own support. 
The evidence further shows and the Court finds that Mrs. 
Murphy made a number of representations, both in writing and 
orally, that she was the sole owner of the property, including the 
"B" piano, that she was giving as collateral for the various loans 
she obtained, and that there were no liens against it. As 
indicated, there were a number of loans made by CTX Financial to 
the defendant Carolyn Murphy, ultimately resulting in Mrs. Murphy 
pledging to CTX Financial for various loans all the household 
furniture and furnishings of all kinds. The evidence shows and the 
Court finds that representatives of CTX Financial were aware that 
she was married, but apparently made no inquiry or had any contact 
with Harry Murphy regarding any potential interest that he may have 
had in any of the pawned furniture and furnishings. CTX Financial 
allowed Mrs. Murphy to retain possession of the piano in question, 
even after it was pawned, as well as the majority, if not all of 
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the other furniture and furnishings she had pawned to CTX 
Financial. 
Defendant Harry Murphy takes the position and has testified 
that the "B" piano was his sole and separate property, and 
therefore his former spouse, Carolyn Murphy, had no interest in 
said property and accordingly no right to pawn the property, giving 
it as collateral to CTX Financial, even though she had represented 
that it was her property. CTX Financial takes the position that 
the piano was marital property, and inasmuch as Carolyn Murphy 
would have had a marital interest in the property, she had the 
right to pawn it, and if it is lost because of failure to repay the 
loans, which occurred in this case, Mr. Murphy's claim must be 
against Carolyn Murphy, who allegedly inappropriately disposed of 
his share of the marital assets. 
Mr. Varadakis and AAA Jewelers take the position that Mr. 
Varadakis purchased the piano directly from Mrs. Murphy, and as 
such Mr. Varadakis claims that he is entitled to ownership of the 
piano. Mr. Varadakis7 relationship with the defendant Carolyn 
Murphy was not in the capacity of using the piano as collateral for 
a loan, but rather an outright purchase as evidenced by a bill of 
sale. Mr. Varadakis testified that he purchased the piano for what 
he believed to be a fair price. He examined the piano and was told 
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by Mrs. Murphy, both orally and in connection with the bill of sale 
that he received, that she owned the property and had the right to 
sell it. He claims status as a bona fide purchaser under the 
circumstances. 
The initial issue is whether Mrs. Murphy had any interest in 
the "B" piano that CTX claims she pawned, or Mr. Varadakis claims 
that she sold. In that regard, Harry Murphy testified that in the 
mid-1960's he purchased the property and that his intent was to 
purchase it as his sole and separate property. He asserts that his 
wife, Carolyn Murphy, never had any interest in the piano, and as 
between he and his wife, it was always considered to be his 
separate property. He testified that he paid the payments on the 
property out of his checking accounts. Mr. Murphy further 
testified that Carolyn Murphy had a piano given to her by a friend 
that was her sole and separate piano, and that accordingly each had 
one of the pianos in the household as their separate property. Mr. 
Murphy testified that he allowed his children and Mrs. Murphy to 
use the piano, both to play and to give piano lessons, and that 
both of them were involved in the maintenance (tuning and such) of 
the piano in question. During the mid-1960's Mr. Murphy was the 
sole income producing spouse in the marriage. Mrs. Murphy was a 
homemaker involved with the children. Apparently her only income 
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producing activity was minor income from music lessons that she 
gave on either one or both of the pianos that were in the household 
in the 1960's. 
As indicated above, Mrs, Murphy has represented both in 
writing and orally to CTX and Varadakis, among others, that she had 
an ownership interest in the property. Mrs. Murphy has filed an 
Affidavit in this case in connection with the pretrial Motions that 
were filed, testifying that the property was separate property of 
Harry Murphy and that she had no interest. When called to testify 
during the course of the trial, Mrs. Murphy declined to answer the 
question as to whether or not she asserted an ownership in the 
property on the basis that her answer may tend to subject her to 
potential criminal liability, and asserted her right against self-
incrimination under both the State and Federal Constitutions. 
The actual manner in which the piano was used during the 
course of the marriage and how it was treated during the course of 
the divorce between the parties, as well as the manner in which the 
parties handled their finances in the mid-1960's during the course 
of their marriage, leads this Court to the conclusion that the now 
stated intention of Mr. Murphy that the ,fBM piano was to be his 
sole and separate property is not reflective of the true status of 
the fIBlf piano. The better evidence supports the proposition that 
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the lfBff piano was marital property. The property acquired during 
the course of the marriage carries a presumption that it is marital 
property. The statements of Mr. Murphy do not overcome that 
presumption, particularly in view of the fact that the piano was 
treated in the household as marital property; the entire family 
used it; Mrs. Murphy was involved in maintaining it, along with Mr. 
Murphy; she apparently gave piano lessons on the ,fBM piano, as well 
as the other piano; and it appears to have been treated during the 
course of the marriage as joint property. The fact that Mr. Murphy 
made the payments is not persuasive, inasmuch as he was the only 
income producing spouse during the time period in question, and the 
fact as he testified that he made the payments out of his checking 
account, do not override the presumption and other factors that the 
"B" piano was considered to be a marital asset. 
Further, the filings of the parties in the divorce action does 
not suggest, nor was there ever a claim asserted in the divorce 
pleadings, that the flBff piano was the sole and separate property of 
Mr. Murphy. The "B" piano was awarded to him as his sole and 
separate property as a result of the divorce Decree, but as 
indicated above, there is nothing in the original filings of Mr. 
Murphy or the proposed resolutions submitted in the divorce court 
by Mr. Murphy that would suggest that he claimed a separate 
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ownership in the nB,f piano. Mrs, Murphy's testimony adds nothing 
to Mr. Murphy's claim, inasmuch as she has made various 
representations regarding ownership interest in the piano at 
various times, and her testimony is inherently unbelievable on that 
subject in this case for either proposition, that is, whether she 
had an ownership interest or whether Mr. Murphy was the sole owner. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the "B" 
piano was, in fact, marital property and that Mrs. Murphy therefore 
had a marital ownership interest in that property and the legal 
right to pawn it or otherwise use it as collateral for loans that 
she obtained from CTX. The fact that she used the majority, if not 
all of the funds for marital purposes when she received them 
contributes to the Court's conclusion in regard to the status of 
the piano being marital property. 
As Mrs. Murphy had a right to utilize the marital property as 
collateral, it cannot be said that CTX's interest, therefore, does 
not exist. To the contrary, CTX Financial had an interest in the 
property pursuant to its taking the property, including the piano, 
as collateral for loans made to Mrs. Murphy. 
Harry Murphy has also asserted that a transfer of the interest 
in the piano, as well as other items, from CTX Financial to a 
sister company, Mutual Mortgage, did not come back to CTX Financial 
CTX V. MURPHY PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
through an appropriate assignment. The evidence shows that there 
was a written assignment from CTX Financial to Mutual Mortgage, but 
there is not a written document offered showing that Mutual 
Mortgage assigned the interest in the property, including the 
piano, back to CTX Financial. CTX Financial's principal agent, 
Michael Wright, testified that there was an assignment back to CTX 
from Mutual Mortgage. While the defendant Harry Murphy, through 
counsel, questions the validity of the testimony because of the 
lack of a written document, there is no evidence that would suggest 
that the testimony of Mr. Wright is not correct, and it was 
received without objection, even though it may not have constituted 
the best evidence. The Court is not willing to make the finding 
that a reassignment did not occur between Mutual Mortgage and CTX 
Financial in face of the testimony offered by Mr. Wright. 
Harry Murphy further asserts that at best, CTX Financial is 
only entitled to assert a claim against that portion of the piano 
which the Court has found to be marital property owned by Mrs. 
Murphy, to wit: 50%. In support of that allegation, Mr. Murphy 
asserts that the knowledge of CTX's agents that dealt with Mrs. 
Murphy as she apparently got herself more deeply involved in loans 
that she was unable to pay, and ultimately ended up pawning and 
using as collateral all the household furniture and furnishings in 
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the Murphy home, should place CTX on notice that Mrs. Murphy was 
encumbering property that was likely marital property to which her 
spouse, Harry Murphy, had an interest. 
In support of that proposition, defendant Murphy's counsel 
directs the Court's attention to the case of Clearfield State Bank 
v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977). In that case, property that 
had been pledged to Clearfield State Bank by the debtor husband 
could not in its entirety be levied upon by the Bank, because the 
Bank was aware that the property was marital and the wife had not 
signed the loan agreements. The principal asserted in Clearfield 
v. Contos, is applicable here. CTX Financial and its agents must 
have had notice that Mrs. Murphy was using as collateral, property 
that is commonly considered to be marital property. CTX Financial 
and its agents were aware that Mrs. Murphy was married, and while 
one may not be placed on notice, actual or constructive, in an 
isolated transaction that a marriage party is attempting to 
encumber the other marriage partner's interest in the property, the 
fact that all the household furniture and furnishings had been 
collateralized does constitute constructive notice that the 
representations being made by Mrs. Murphy that she was the sole 
owner of all the property in the home were likely incorrect. At 
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the very least, there was a duty to inquire, which CTX Financial 
did not do. 
Under the circumstances and the facts of this case, this Court 
concludes that the most interest that CTX Financial can assert 
against the piano with which we are concerned in this suit is the 
interest actually owned by Carolyn Murphy, and that is, 50% of its 
value. Therefore, CTX's claims against the "B" piano are limited 
to one-half its value. 
Turning to the claims of Mike Varadakis and AAA Jewelers, and 
for purposes of these proceedings the Court considers them one and 
the same, the Court determines that Mr. Varadakis' position is 
substantially different than CTX's position. 
Mr. Varadakis purchased the piano for consideration from Mrs. 
Murphy. The transaction was a single, isolated sale. There is 
nothing in the record that would suggest that Mr. Varadakis was on 
notice that she did not own the piano as she represented, and 
because it was a single transaction, there is nothing that would 
suggest that there was a duty to inquire on the part of Mr. 
Varadakis as to anyone else's potential interest in the piano. 
Obviously, Mr. Varadakis took the piano subject to the one-half 
interest that the Court has determined is appropriate as far as CTX 
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is concerned, but those issues have been resolved, as the Court 
understands it, between CTX and Varadakis• 
There is nothing in this record that would suggest that Mr. 
Varadakis was anything other than a bona fide purchaser for value, 
and as Mrs. Murphy had an interest in the piano which she could 
sell, Mr. Varadakis is entitled to the ownership of the piano in 
its entirety, having purchased the same for legitimate 
consideration without knowledge, actual or constructive, of Harry 
Murphy's interest as the spouse of Carolyn Murphy. Mr. Murphy's 
remedy as to the loss of his one-half interest as sold by his 
spouse to Mr. Varadakis is a claim against Mrs. Murphy for having 
sold his interest in the "B" piano, and apparently for violating 
the divorce court's restraining order prohibiting Mrs. Murphy from 
selling property during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. 
The Court then determines that Mr. Varadakis is the party who 
is entitled to possession and ownership of the "B" piano, and that 
claims asserted against the piano by the remaining active 
defendant, Harry Murphy, are not valid against Varadakis' 
ownership. As between CTX and Harry Murphy and who might be 
entitled to recover fees from one another, the Court determines 
that there is not a clear prevailing party, and that those parties 
should bear their own attorney's fees and costs in these 
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proceedings. There is no statutory or contractual basis to award 
Varadakis attorney's fees, however, he is entitled to costs 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Counsel for CTX Financial and Varadakis is to prepare the 
appropriate set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment, unless the parties agree between them that they are 
willing to waive Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and merely 
have a Judgment entered in accordance with this Memorandum Decision 
relating to the ownership of the piano. If Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are not waived by both parties, then the Court 
expects that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
Judgment will be reviewed by counsel for the defendant Harry Murphy 
after being prepared by counsel for CTX and Varadakis, and that the 
Court will ultimately receive an agreed upon form of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment which/the Court can consider 
in accordance with Rule 4-501 of/ the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this j£) day of April/ 1994 
^IMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 4 j j p g j 
t/*? its -& ^ J /£frwL}^i**r* / 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CTX FINANCIAL, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROLYN MURPHY, HARRY MURPHY, 
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS, MIKE 
VARDAKIS, LeGRAND L. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920901080 CN 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
This action was tried by the Court, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on March 7-8, 1994. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by its attorneys, Brenda L. Flanders and 
Dena C. Sarandos of Flanders & Associates. Defendants AAA 
Jewelers and Mike Vardakis were present and represented by their 
trial counsel, Brenda L. Flanders and Dena C. Sarandos of 
Flanders & Associates. Defendant Harry Murphy was present and 
represented by his attorneys, Reid E. Lewis and Mark W. May of 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. Defendant Carolyn Murphy appeared only as a 
witness pursuant to subpoena. Defendant LeGrande L. Christensen 
did not appear and he was not represented. Witnesses were called 
and examined. Exhibits were received by the Court, and the Court 
took judicial notice of documents filed as of record. Counsel 
argued their clients' positions. The Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the commencement of trial, the Court was 
advised regarding the status of the various parties. The Court 
understands defendant Carolyn Murphy has filed bankruptcy, which 
is pending. AAA Jewelers and Varadakis are active parties and 
apparently have paid the plaintiff CTX Financial for their 
claimed interest in the piano, which is the subject of this suit. 
CTX has dismissed its claims against AAA and Varadakis, and CTX 
agreed to indemnify AAA and Varadakis up to the sum of $6,000 for 
any losses that Varadakis and AAA Jewelers may suffer as a result 
of the asserted claim by defendant Harry Murphy against the piano 
in question. Defendant Harry Murphy remains an active defendant 
in the suit, asserting his claim of ownership in the subject 
piano, and the defendant LeGrande L. Christensen has apparently 
disclaimed any interest he may have in the piano in question and 
did not appear. Carolyn Murphy appeared as a witness, with the 
understanding that any claims asserted against her or by her are 
stayed as a result of her bankruptcy. 
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2. The Court understands the principal contestants in 
this proceeding, based upon the various status of the various 
plaintiffs and defendants, are CTX on its individual claims 
asserted by Varadakis and Varadakis' individual (AAA) claims 
against the claims of Harry Murphy with regard to the ownership 
in a piano which was described as the "B" piano, 
3. At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court heard 
arguments of counsel and took the matter under advisement to 
consider the single issue that was presented during the course of 
the trial, to wit: who was the proper entity to have title to 
the piano in question? 
4. The evidence in this case shows that Carolyn 
Murphy is the former wife of defendant Harry Murphy, and that 
during the course of their marriage she utilized the flBf! piano as 
collateral for various loans she obtained. In fact, the evidence 
shows that she utilized all the marital household property, 
including another piano, and all the household furnishing as 
collateral for various loans she obtained from CTX Financial, 
5. The evidence shows and the Court finds that 
Carolyn Murphy at no time prior to the divorce between she and 
defendant Harry Murphy disclosed to Mr. Murphy the fact that she 
had pawned or otherwise indebted the family furniture and 
furnishings to CTX Financial. 
6. Ms. Murphy has testified, and the Court finds her 
testimony accurate that the money she obtained in the loans was 
for the most part used for marital purposes, including her own support. 
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7. The evidence further shows and the Court finds 
that Mrs. Murphy made a number of representations, both in 
writing and orally, that she was the sole owner of the property, 
including the "B" piano, that she was giving as collateral for 
the various loans she obtained, and that there were no liens 
against it. As indicated, there were a number of loans made by 
CTX Financial to the defendant Carolyn Murphy, ultimately 
resulting in Mrs. Murphy pledging to CTX Financial for various 
loans all the household furniture and furnishings of all kinds. 
8. The evidence shows and the Court finds that 
representatives of CTX Financial were aware that she was married, 
but apparently made no inquiry or had any contact with Harry 
Murphy regarding any potential interest that he may have had in 
any of the pawned furniture and furnishings. 
9. CTX Financial allowed Mrs. Murphy to retain 
possession of the piano in question, even after it was pawned, as 
well as the majority, if not all of the other furniture and 
furnishings she had pawned to CTX Financial. 
10. Defendant Harry Murphy takes the position and has 
testified that the "B" piano was his sole and separate property, 
and, therefore, his former spouse, Carolyn Murphy, had no 
interest in the property and accordingly no right to pawn the 
property, giving it as collateral to CTX Financial, even though 
she had represented that it was her property. 
11. CTX Financial takes the position that the piano 
was marital property, and inasmuch as Carolyn Murphy would have 
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had a marital interest in the property, she had the right to pawn 
it, and if it is lost because of failure to repay the loans, 
which occurred in this case, Mr, Murphy's claim must be against 
Carolyn Murphy, who allegedly inappropriately disposed of his 
share of the marital assets. 
12. Mr. Varadakis and AAA Jewelers take the position 
that Mr. Varadakis purchased the piano directly from Mrs. Murphy, 
and as such Mr. Varadakis claims that he is entitled to ownership 
of the piano. Mr. Varadakis' relationship with the defendant 
Carolyn Murphy was not in the capacity of using the piano as 
collateral for a loan, but rather an outright purchase as 
evidenced by a bill of sale. 
13. Mr. Varadakis testified that he purchased the 
piano for what he believed to be a fair price. He examined the 
piano and was told by Mrs. Murphy, both orally and in connection 
with the bill of sale that he received, that she owned the 
property and had the right to sell it. He claims status as a 
bona fide purchaser under the circumstances. 
14. The initial issue is whether Mrs. Murphy had any 
interest in the flBff piano that CTX claims she pawned, or Mr. 
Varadakis claims that she sold. In that regard, Harry Murphy 
testified that in the mid-1960's he purchased the property and 
that his intent was to purchase it as his sole and separate 
property. He asserts that his wife, Carolyn Murphy, never had 
any interest in the piano, and as between he and his wife, it was 
always considered to be his separate property. He testified that 
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he paid the payments on the property out of his checking 
accounts. Mr. Murphy further testified that Carolyn Murphy had a 
piano given to her by a friend that was her sole and separate 
piano, and that accordingly each had one of the pianos in the 
household as their separate property. Mr. Murphy testified that 
he allowed his children and Mrs. murphy to use the piano, both to 
play and to give piano lessons, and that both of them were 
involved in the maintenance (tuning and such) of the piano in 
question. 
15. During the mid-1960's Mr. Murphy was the sole 
income producing spouse in the marriage. Mrs. Murphy was a 
homemaker involved with the children. Apparently, her only 
income producing activity was minor income from music lessons 
that she gave on either one or both of the pianos that were in 
the household in the 1960's. 
16. As indicated above, Mrs. Murphy has represented 
both in writing and orally to CTX and Varadakis, among others, 
that she had an ownership interest in the property. Mrs. Murphy 
has filed an Affidavit in this case in connection with the 
pretrial Motions that were filed, testifying that the property 
was separate property of Harry Murphy and that she had no 
interest. When called to testify during the course of the trial, 
Mrs. Murphy declined to answer the question as to whether or not 
she asserted an ownership in the property on the basis that the 
answer may tend to subject her to potential criminal liability, 
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and she asserted her right against self-incrimination under both 
the state and federal constitutions. 
17. The actual manner in which the piano was used 
during the course of the marriage and how it was treated during 
the course of the divorce between the parties, as well as the 
manner in which the parties handled their finances in the mid-
1960 's during the course of their marriage, leads this Court to 
the conclusion that the now stated intention of Mr. Murphy that 
the "B" piano was to be his sole and separate property is not 
reflective of the true status of the "B" piano. 
18. The better evidence supports the proposition that 
the "B" piano was marital property. The property acquired during 
the course of the marriage carries a presumption that it is 
marital property. The statements of Mr. Murphy do not overcome 
that presumption, particularly in view of the fact that the piano 
was treated in the household as marital property; the entire 
family used it; Mrs. Murphy was involved in maintaining it, along 
with Mr. Murphy; she apparently gave piano lessons on the nBfl 
piano, as well as the other piano; and it appears to have been 
treated during the course of the marriage as joint property. 
19. The fact that Mr. Murphy made the payments is not 
persuasive, inasmuch as he was the only income producing spouse 
during the time period in question, and the fact as he testified 
that he made the payments our of his checking account, do not 
override the presumption and other factors that the ,fB" piano was 
considered to be a marital asset. 
mb rel fofcol coc 7 
20. Further, the filings of the Murphys in their 
divorce action do not suggest, nor was there ever a claim 
asserted in the divorce pleadings, that the "B" piano was the 
sole and separate property of Mr. Murphy. The "Bff piano was 
awarded to him as his sole and separate property as a result of 
the Divorce Decree, but as indicated above, there is nothing in 
the original filings of Mr. Murphy or the proposed resolutions 
submitted in the divorce court by Mr. Murphy that would suggest 
that he claimed a separate ownership in the "B" piano. 
21. Mrs. Murphy's testimony adds nothing to Mr. 
Murphy's claim, inasmuch as she has made various representations 
regarding ownership interest in the piano at various times, and 
her testimony is inherently unbelievable on that subject in this 
case for either proposition, that is, whether she had an 
ownership interest or whether Mr. Murphy was the sole owner. 
22. Harry Murphy has also asserted that a transfer of 
the interest in the piano, as well as other items, from CTX_^r 
Financial to a sister company, Mutual Mortgage, did not come back 
to CTX Financial through an appropriate assignment. The evidence 
shows that there was a written assignment from CTX Financial to 
Mutual Mortgage, but there is not a written document offered 
showing that Mutual Mortgage assigned the interest in the 
property, including the piano, back to CTX Financial. CTX 
Financial's principal agent, Michael Wright, testified that there 
was an assignment back to CTX from Mutual Mortgage. While the 
defendant Harry Murphy, through counsel, questions the validity 
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of the testimony because of the lack of a written document, there 
is no evidence that would suggest that the testimony of Mr. 
Wright is not correct, and it was received without objection, 
even though it may not have constituted the best evidence. The 
Court is not willing to make the finding that a reassignment did 
not occur between Mutual Mortgage and CTX Financial in face of 
the testimony offered by Mr. Wright. 
23. Harry Murphy further asserts that at best, CTX 
Financial is only entitled to assert a claim against the portion 
of the piano which the Court has found to be marital property 
owned by Mrs. Murphy, to wit: 50%. In support of that 
allegation, Mr. Murphy assets that the knowledge of CTX's agents 
that dealt with Mrs. Murphy as she apparently got herself more 
deeply involved in loans that she was unable to pay, and 
ultimately ended up pawning and using as collateral all the 
household furniture and furnishings in the Murphy home, should 
place CTX on notice that Mrs. Murphy was encumbering property 
that was likely marital property to which her spouse, Harry 
Murphy, had an interest. 
24. In support of that proposition, defendant Murphy's 
counsel directs the Court's attention to the case of Clearfield 
State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977). In that case, 
property that had been pledged to Clearfield State Bank by the 
debtor husband could not in its entirety be levied upon by the 
Bank, because the Bank was aware that the property was marital 
and the wife had not signed the loan agreements. The principal 
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asserted in Clearfield v. Contos, is applicable here. CTX 
Financial and its agents must have had notice that Mrs. Murphy 
was using as collateral, property that is commonly considered to 
be marital property. CTX Financial and its agents were aware 
that Mrs.-Murphy was married, and'while one may not be placed on 
notice, actual or constructive, in an isolated transaction that a 
married party is attempting to encumber the other marriage 
partner's interest in the property, the fact that all the 
household furniture and furnishings had been collateralized does 
constitute constructive notice that the representations being 
made by Mrs. Murphy that she was the sole owner of all the 
property in the home were likely incorrect. At the very least, 
there was a duty to inquire, which CTX Financial did not do. 
25. Turning to the claims of Mike Varadakis and AAA 
Jewelers, and for purposes of these proceedings the Court 
considers them one and the same, the Court determines that Mr. 
Varadakis' position is substantially different than CTX's 
position. 
26. Mr. Varadakis purchased the piano for 
consideration from Mrs. Murphy. The transaction was a single, 
isolated sale. There is nothing in the record that would suggest 
that Mr. Varadakis was on notice that she did not own the piano 
as she represented, and because it was a single transaction, 
there is nothing that would suggest that there was a duty to 
inquire on the part of Mr. Varadakis as to anyone else's 
potential interest in the piano. Obviously, Mr. Varadakis took 
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the piano subject to the one-half interest that the Court has 
determined is appropriate as far as CTX is concerned, but those 
issues have been resolved, as the Court understands it, between 
CTX and Varadakis. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The property acquired during the course of Carolyn 
and Harry Murphy's marriage carries a presumption that it is 
marital property, 
2. The "B" piano was, in fact, marital property and 
that Mrs. Murphy therefore had a marital ownership interest in 
that property and the legal right to pawn it or otherwise use it 
as collateral for loans that she obtained from CTX. The fact 
that she used the majority, if not all of the funds for marital 
purposes when she received them contributes to the Court's 
conclusion in regard to the status of the piano being marital 
property. 
3. As Mrs. Murphy had a right to utilize the marital 
property as collateral, it cannot be said that CTX's interest, 
therefore, does not exist. To the contrary, CTX Financial had an 
interest in the property pursuant to its taking the property, 
including the piano, as collateral for loans made to Mrs. Murphy. 
4. The case of Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1977) is applicable here. 
5. The most interest that CTX Financial can assert 
against the piano with which we are concerned in this suit is the 
interest actually owned by Carolyn Murphy, and that is, 50% of 
mb rel fofcol coc 1 1 
its value. Therefore, CTX's claims against the "Bf! piano are 
limited to one-half its value. 
6. There is nothing in this record that would suggest 
that Mr. Varadakis was anything other than a bona fide purchaser 
for value, and as Mrs. Murphy had an interest in the piano which 
she could sell, Mr. Varadakis is entitled to the ownership of the 
piano in its entirety, having purchased the same for legitimate 
consideration without knowledge, actual or constructive, of Harry 
Murphy's interest as the spouse of Carolyn Murphy. 
7. Mr. Murphy's remedy as to the loss of his one-half 
interest as sold by his spouse to Mr. Varadakis is a claim 
against Mrs. Murphy for having sold his interest in the "B" 
piano, and apparently for violating the divorce court's 
restraining order prohibiting Mrs. Murphy from selling property 
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. 
8. Mr. Varadakis is the party who is entitled to 
possession and ownership of the !fB!f piano, and claims asserted 
against the piano by the remaining active defendant, Harry 
Murphy, are not valid against Varadakis' ownership. 
9. As between CTX and Harry Murphy and who might be 
entitled to recover fees from one another, the Court determines 
that there is not a clear prevailing party, and that those 
parties should bear their own attorney's fees and costs in these 
proceedings. 
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10. There is no statutory or contractual basis to 
award Varadakis attorney's fees, however^he is entitled to costs 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules o^ r Civil Procedure. 
iqq£ BY THE COURT: 
'0AU* S^, 
FORM APPROVED: 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Dena S. Sarandos 
Attorneys for CTX Financial 
Trial Counsel for AAA Jewelers 
and Mike Varadakis 
Scott 0. Mercer 
Attorney for AAA Jewelers and Mike Varadakis 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on May 24, 1994, a copy of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Brenda L. Flanders 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
56 East Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott O. Mercer 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Reid E. Lewis (no. 1951), and 
Mark W. May (no. 5512), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Harry Murphy 
FSLSD SSSTSMST S2UST 
Third Jucicai District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CTX FINANCIAL, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROLYN MURPHY, HARRY MURPHY, 
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS, MIKE 
VARDAKIS, LeGRAND L. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920901080 CN 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
This action was tried by the Court, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on March 7-8, 1994. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by its attorneys, Brenda L. Flanders and 
Dena C. Sarandos of Flanders & Associates. Defendants AAA 
Jewelers and Mike Vardakis were present and represented by their 
trial counsel, Brenda L. Flanders and Dena C. Sarandos of 
Flanders & Associates. Defendant Harry Murphy was present and 
represented by his attorneys, Reid E. Lewis and Mark W. May of 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. Defendant Carolyn Murphy appeared only as a 
witness pursuant to subpoena. Defendant LeGrande L. Christensen 
did not appear and he was not represented. Witnesses were called 
and examined. Exhibits were received by the Court, and the Court 
took judicial notice of documents filed as of record. Counsel 
argued their clients' positions. The Court having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby grants judgment 
as follows: 
1. Mike Vardakis shall have possession and ownership 
of the Mason & Hamblin semi-concert grand piano, model B, no. 
25369. 
2. The parties shall bear their own attorney's fees. 
3. Mike Vardakis is entitled to his costs incurred in 
this action pursuant to Rule 54(b) of thelrtah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and all other parties shall^i^ear their own costs, 
DATED: ( Q ^ > ^ <P<P^ / 1994. 
FORM APPROVED: 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Dena S. Sarandos 
Attorneys for CTX Financial 
Trial Counsel for AAA Jewelers 
and Mike Vardakis 
Scott 0. Mercer 
Attorney for AAA Jewelers and Mike Vardakis 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I c e r t i f y t h a t on May 1 9 9 4 , a c o p y o f t h e J u d g m e n t 
was h a n d - d e l i v e r e d t o e a c h of t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
B r e n d a L. F l a n d e r s 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
56 E a s t Broadway 
S u i t e 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott O. Mercer 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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